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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERMAN J. PREECE, STATE AU-
DITOR OF THE STATE OF UTAH,, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
8138 
BRIEF AND MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, State Tax Commission, brought action 
against the defendant, State Auditor, to require defendant 
to provide plaintiff with four-cent cigarette stamps under 
the authority of 59-18-10 U. C. A. 1953 requiring the State 
Auditor to prepare stamps for use on packages and contain-
ers according to such specifications, designs and denomina-
tions as may be submitted to him by the Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff requisitioned said stamps under the terms of 
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H. B. 34, First Special Session of the 30th Legislature, 
amending Sec. 59-18-4 U. C. A. 1953 by providing that on all 
cigarettes weighing less than three pounds per thousand, 
two mills ( 4c per package) should be charged on each cig-
arette rather than one mill (2c per package) as previously 
provided. 
The State Auditor under the provisions of 59-18-10 
and his general powers enumerated in Ch. 3 of Title 67, 
U. C. A. 1953, and upon advice and opinion of the At-
torney General, refused to provide stamps representing the 
additional tax. The sole reason for refusal was the uncon-
stitutionality of H. B. 34 as being in violation of Art. VII, 
Sec. 6, Utah Constitution.. On that refusal the plaintiff 
State Tax Commission brought action for an extraordinary 
writ to compel the · State Auditor to prepare and deliver 
said stamps to plaintiff. 
On November 17, 1953, the Governor of the State of 
Utah, ·by proclamation, called the Legislature into session 
to convene December 1, 1953, and enumerated as the pur-
pose of his call thirteen items recommended by .the Public 
School Survey Commission, the Legislative Council and the 
Governor himself, all of which items pertained to the pub-
lic school system. None of the enumerated subjects dealt 
with taxation (Exhibit A). · On December 1, 1953, the 
Governor delivered his opening message to the Joint Com-
mittee of all members of the House and Senate in which 
he again withheld the entire subject of taxation although 
he included items for consideration of the Legislature not 
called to their attention in the proclamation (Exhibit B). 
That same day he communicated with both houses by letter, 
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recommending legislation to control the internal financing 
of universities and colleges and recommended a provision 
requiring assessment of all property for property tax pur-
poses to be made every five-year period (Exhibit C). 
On December 3rd, additional matters were called to 
the attention of the Legislature by letter-none included 
taxation (Exhibit D). 
On December 4, 1953 the Governor appeared again 
before the Legislature and recommended a program of 
school financing which, insofar as the state-supported pro-
gram is concerned, paralleled that program theretofore pro-
posed by the Legislative Council (Exhibit J, para. 6). In 
that same message the Governor said: 
"I am not here to propose new or higher taxes 
to finance the school program, but I do intend to 
propose changes in our present school financing Ia w 
as well as certain reductions in some state services" 
(Exhibit F, p~ge 6, para. 5). 
At paragraph 4-F, page 8, Exhibit F, the Governor 
stated further : 
"The Legislative Council has devised a new 
method of· establishing the uniform school levy in 
the districts to support the basic school program. 
The uniform levy under the old law was determined 
by the levy required in the wealthiest district to 
finance the basis or minimum school program in 
that district. The new plan proposes a ten mill local 
levy for a $3450 per unit program graduated up to 
a 12 mill local levy for a $4050 program. This plan 
provides that any tax yield in excess of the minimum 
program for any district would revert to the Uni-
form School Fund for distribution to the remaining 
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school districts. I recommend that the legislation to 
implement this plan as prepared by the Legislative 
Council be adopted." 
Paragraph 5-F of the same exhibit and page shows the 
Governor's proposal to permit taxation above the minimum 
school program only upon a vote of those people to be 
taxed, i.e., qualified taxpaying electors. At page 9 of that 
exhibit, paragraph 7-F and 8-F, the Governor recommended 
the transfer of use of an existing income to the· state from 
the School Lunch Fund to the Uniform School Fund. This 
involved an earmarking of funds only, not the resort to a 
new source of taxes. 
Subsequent messages were given to the Legislature 
(Exhibits G, H, and I) in which local property taxes in 
various forms were dealt with (a municipal four-mill levy 
and a levy to secure general obligation bonds); but at no 
point was reference made to any other form of taxation or 
to state taxation. 
The Governor recommended the abolition of certain 
schools as a means of increasing available aid to elementary 
and secondary education, but this can no more be said to be 
a "revenue" measure than can his admonition to curtail 
excesses i~ the system. 
The call of the Special Session had been an upshot 
of demands for investigation and action to remedy "the 
public .school problem." In 1951 the Utah Legislature 
created a Public School Survey Commission (Ch. 14, Laws 
of 1951, 1st S. S.) . The duties of the Commission were to 
study all ramifications of the educational program in the 
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State of Utah and to make recommendations. Among their 
duties was the study of "taxation and permanent financ-
ing of public education, including the adequacy and equity 
of the present tax base for the support of public schools." 
Sec. 3 (g), Ch. 14, Laws of 1951, 1st S. S. This latter duty 
the Commission had not sufficient time to perform and in 
their final report of February, 1953, to the Governor and 
Legislature, at page 188, said: 
"The Commission has not undertaken a detailed 
study of tax sources to help provide revenue for 
financing the state-supported minim urn school pro-
gram" (Exhibit J, para.. 2). 
Because of this circumstance the 1953 Legislature 
assigned that study to the Legislative Council (S. J. R. 26, 
Laws of 1953). Thereafter the State Tax Commission· em-
ployed special research experts to assist in that study. 
Neither agency had reported to the Legislature at the time 
of the Special Session (Exhibit J, para. 3). 
The Survey Commission reported to the Legislative 
Council on those matters\ not related to taxation and the 
latter began drafting legislation to effect the recommenda-
tions of the Survey Commission. Those bills of the Council 
affecting school finance constituted the program recom-
mended by the Governor in his message of December 4th 
(Exhibit J, para. 4; Exhibit F, pages 7 and 8). 
The Legislative Council, under its statutory duty to 
disseminate information to each member of the Legislature, 
compiled a staff report annexing thereto its proposed 
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legislation, and in the report explaining the bills drawn 
said: 
"The recommendations of the Utah Legislative 
Council would require some adjustment upwards in 
the local levy for a state-supported program and a 
slight reduction in the state levy to provide the re-
quired state aid. Greater equalization of tax effort 
would be possible and added funds would be pro-
vided in the minimum program with additional local 
leeway. The Council has not recommended any 
change in the present tax structure to finance the 
proposed legislation. The. completion of the current 
!tax study at an early date should afford a sound 
basis for constructive recommendations on state 
taxation for the next regular session" (Emphasis 
added) (Exhibit J, para. 5). 
While it must be admitted that the total cost of the 
state-supported school program became greater, it is signifi-
cant that the burden of the state did not. From Exhibit K, 
constituting the most reliable figures available at this time 
as to the respective cost of a program conducted for the 
current fiscal year under the old and under the new laws, 
it appears that, considering the accruing state obligation un-
der Teachers' Retirement, the total state obligation actual-
ly became less under the new law proposed by the Governor 
upon recommendation of the Legislative Council and Sur-
vey Commission. When Teachers' Retirement is added to 
other costs to the state, the new law totals a greater state 
obligation than that actually appropriated under the old 
law. However, when the legal requirement of $1,000,000.00 
or the actuarial estimate of $2,000,000.00 required of the 
state in its contribution to the previous retirement pro-
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gram (and in which the state is in default) is added to the 
other costs under the prior law, the state's obligation under 
the new law becomes less than under the old law. These new 
provisions (H. B.'s 27, 28 and 47 relating to school finance 
and S,. B. 22 relating to retirement) were what the Legisl-
lature, the Legislative Council, the Public School Survey 
Commission, the Governor, and all interested citizens of the 
State of Utah had in mind when they were considering the 
"school problem.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTSt 
POINT I. 
THE GOVERNOR DID NOT BY EXPRESS 
LANGUAGE CALL SUCH LEGISLATIVE BUS-
INESS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE AS WOULD PERMIT IMPOSITION 
OF A TAX ON CIGARETTES. 
1. The specification of one form of tax does not 
permit legislation on all forms or on the gen-
eral subject of taxation. 
2. The Governor, if he authorized an increased tax 
at the state level, authorized only a property 
tax. 
tNote: Due to the required haste in briefing and submitting this 
question, the briefs, unfortunately, may not be completely responsive 
one to the other. This brief will attempt to meet in Points I and II, 
the arguments of plaintiff in its sub-points A, B and C under its 
Point I. As to plaintiff's Point II, the defendant will concede that 
there is a presumption that every Act of the Legislature is valid. 
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POINT II. 
THE GOVERNOR PROPOSED NO LEGISLA-
TION MANIFESTLY REQUIRING THE AP-
PROPRIATION OF ADDITIONAL REVENUE 
AND DID NOT BY THAT TYPE OF IMPLICA-
TION AUTHORIZE A TAX ON CIGARETTES 
(H. B. 34). 
1. The Governor's authorized legislation required 
no additional state taxes. 
2. If the Governor's message and recommended 
legislation implied authorization to tax ciga-
rettes, his express words rejected that impli-
cation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE GOVERNOR DID NOT BY EXPRESS 
LANGUAGE CALL SUCH LEGISLATIVE BUS-
INESS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE AS WOULD PERMIT IMPOSITION 
OF A TAX ON CIGARETTES. 
Art. VII, Sec. 6 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"On extraordinary occasions, the Governor may 
convene the Legislature by proclamation, in which 
shall be stated the purpose for which the Legislature 
is to be convened, and it shall transact no legislative 
business except that for which it was especially con-
vened, or such other legislative business as the Gov-
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ernor may call to its attention while in session. The 
Legislature, however, may provide for the expenses 
of the session and other matters incidental thereto. 
The Governor may also by proclamation convene the 
Senate in extraordinary session for the transaction 
of executive business." 
This provision has been held to be mandatory (State v. 
Pugh, 31 Ariz. 317, 252 P. 1018) and any law enacted at 
a Special Session other than on the subject or subjects des-
ignated by the executive's call or message is without author-
ity and void. State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P. 2d 921. 
This court in State v. Tweed, 63 Utah 176, 224 P. 443, 
and State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P. 2d 921, has held 
that constitutional provision to have been intended to leave 
the matter of Special Sessions of the Legislature in the 
hands of the Governor and to the end that he may have 
complete control over the "legislative business" that shall 
be considered. 
For purposes of the argument on this point only, we 
might concede that the Governor permitted an increase in 
taxes at the state level, for, as we will show, any such tax 
could only have been a property tax. We do not concede that 
fact for all purposes, for our argument in Point II hereof 
attempts to show by accompanying stipulated exhibits that 
the program recommended by the Governor, the Legislative 
Council, and the Public School Survey Commission was 
geared to less state contribution to the state supported 
school program, and that no state tax was authorized or 
needed. However, even if it be determined as a basic prem-
ise that state support was increased at the Special Session 
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by bills within the call of th~ Governor, we believe that the 
Governor specified only property taxation as a tax to which 
resort could be had for obtaining the additional funds re-
quired, and our argument under this point is designed to 
sho'v that the prevailing weight and better reasoned au-
thority is that such a tax may be specified without open-
ing up the entire field of taxation. 
1. The specification of one form of tax does not 
permit legislation on all forms or on· the gen-
eral subject of taxation. 
One major purpose of provisions of this nature is that 
notice shall be given to the public that certain subjects are 
to be considered, thus warning all persons interested to be 
present if they so desire, so that rights and interests may 
not be acted upon without notice. 50 Am. Jur., p. 64, Stat-
utes, Sec. 46. Richmond v. Lay, 261 Ky. 138, 87 S. W. 2d 
134. In that latter case a call was issued to raise revenue 
for schools, a call substantially broader as pertains to the 
field of taxation than the call in this case, and at the Ses-
sion a bill was enacted to require payment of a $2.00 re-
newal fee for teachers' certificates and to permit lifetime 
certificates for teachers having twenty years' service. The 
$2.00 fee was approved as being a revenue measure. The 
life certificate provision was struck down as being without 
the call. 
In Smith et al. v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N. W. 
453, the Governor issued a proclamation permitting legis-
lation to validate bonds previously voted, but having tech-
nical deficiencies otherwise. The admitted purpose of the 
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call was to validate an entire $360,000,000.00 package of 
refunding bonds. However, of that package a portion had 
not been authorized by vote and the case indicates that de-
ficiency could have been cured by the Legislature, it not 
being a constitutional question. The court held: Those 
bonds not authorized by a vote of the people were not vali-
dated. The call was sufficiently restrictive to permit vali-
dation of only voted bonds. Thus we have a situation strik-
ingly parallel to the one here considered. Rights of indi-
viduals, i. e., th~se required to consent by popular vote, 
could not be invaded without a call sufficiently broad to 
apprise them of action permitted at the Special Session 
(Exhibit F, p. 8, para. 5, 6). The court developed in the 
Curran decision the theory defendants now adopt as to the 
meaning of the term "subject" or "legislative business". 
Evolving the rule of Michigan the court held: 
"The 'subject' submitted in the message was 
wholesale validation of bonds. It covered only kinds 
of bonds which form a logical and natural class for 
validation separate and distinct from the other 
classes also covered by Act 31. While the Governor 
within the range of a 'subject' may not restrict the 
Legislature, he has the authority to limit the subject 
according to his conception of the need for legisla-
tion. Thus a proposal for action upon a certain tax 
would not throw open the ~vhole matter of taxation 
for legislation or a recommendation as to a crime 
would not include the entire realm of criminal law" 
(Emphasis added) . 
The· functioning of state government may be divided 
into numerous and heterogeneous subjects: Public welfare, 
public service, public works, public lands, schools, and tax-
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ation, to name only a few. Each of these broad subjects 
has as many component parts as the sum of its functions, 
~uties, powers, inhibitions, limitations and requirements 
for support, operation and maintenance. Thus each "sub-
ject" of government may be subdivided into molecular com-
ponents, each of which is logically, distinctly separable 
from, though related to, all the othe-rs. None is wholly un-
related to any other, and by imaginative strain, any in-
finitesimal part of one subject may be made to relate to 
any part of almost any other subject. But just a-s the general 
subject "anilnal" may by the addition of qualifying limi-
tations be reduced to the concept "man" and this down to 
some special race or class or group of men, the consideration 
of any general subject of state government may be reduced 
by restricted modification to one of its functions, duties, 
powers or requirements. State v~ Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456, 
161 S. W. 1006. Thus consideration of any function of gov-
ernment, such as taxation, may be logically restricted as to 
the field of its operation, the class to be regulated, the 
group to be affected, and the subject matter to be taxed. 
In the Woollen case (128 Tenn. 456, 161 S. W. 1006) it is 
held in a well reasoned and much cited decision that the 
Governor may specify the general subject of appropriations 
and- then, by specifying the institutions to which approp-
riations are to be made, so restrict the call and the general 
subject, appropriations, as to exclude appropriation to any 
and all other institutions and departments. 
In Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697, 
an academic discussion and analysis of the cases involved 
treats the question of whether or not when a general sub-
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ject is stated, the specification of a particular matter in 
connection therewith opens the door for legislation germane 
to the general subject, but beyond the scope of the specifi-
cation. Commonwealth v. Liveright holds that it does not. 
The court at page 704, 161 Atl. said: 
"There are some decisions which go to the ex-
tent of holding that when a general subject is men-
tioned the doors are thrown open to legislation on 
that subject. But these authorities appear to be in 
the minority and are opposed to the well considered 
opinions of other states" (Emphasis added). 
Cited with approval are the Woollen case (128 Tenn. 456, 
161 S. W. 1006) and Denver & Rio Grande Railway Com-
pany v. Moss, 50 Colo. 282, 115 P. 696. 
The Colorado case holds that when the specification 
is too broad, the result is that no subject is constitutional 
for the reason that the spirit of the constitutional provision 
limiting the scope of legislation would be emasculated. No 
notice could be given to interested persons, nor could any 
restraint be imposed against over-legislation at the tax-
payers' expense. 50 Am. Jur., p. 64, Statutes, Sec. 46. In 
the Liveright case at page 715 of 161 Atl., an illustration 
is made of the inequities stemming from the broad inter-
pretation and application of a call upon a subject. Although 
writing a dissenting opinion, this Judge agrees with the 
majority in its holding that permission to consider a por-
tion of one subject does not permit legislation on the entire 
subject. In so doing he says : 
"For instance, if the Governor designated the 
subject of 'taxation' as one of those to be considered, 
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then any and every branch of that subject, taxation 
upon capital stock, taxation upon inheritanc-es, taxa-
tion upon moneys and interest, etc. could be made 
the subject of legislation at the 'special session' 
* * * On the other hand i{ the subject of the 
tax on capital stock was the only one designated in 
the proclamation, none of the other branches of the 
general subject of taxation could constitutionally be 
passed upon by the Legislature at that whole session. 
Up to this point also the whole court agrees." 
A case almost startingly in point is Simms v. Weldon, 
165 Ark. 13, 263 S. W. 42. In that case the Governor issued 
a call to raise revenues for schools in response to a wide-
spread public demand prompting the Governor to act. The 
Governor's opening message to the Legislature stated: 
"The financial distress of the public schools of 
the state has compelled me to convene you for the 
purpose of considering and passing laws for relief." 
The Governor included in his call taxation on income, a 
severance tax and matters regarding collection of gross 
income taxes. The session passed an act levying a tax on 
the sale of cigars and cigarettes. The court held the tax 
invalid, saying : 
"The Governor specified presumably all that 
was in his mind at the time he issued the proclama-
tion and we are not at liberty to go back of that call 
to determine what purpose the taxation was intended 
for. The call was to pass an income tax law and 
the passage of such a law, regardless of the approp-
rh1tion of the revenues thus raised, would have been 
within the call, but any other kind of a tax, regard-
les_s of the appropriation to any given use was not 
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within the call. The mental attitude of the Governor 
as to his intention, not expressed in the proclama-
tion, does not supply tbe specifications required by 
the Constitution. The fact that the other taxes rep-
resented in the call were earmarked for use by the 
schools does not broaden the scope of the call, for 
neither relates to a sales tax on cigarettes and ci-
gars." 
That court agreed that the Governor was required to 
confine legislation to particular subjects, but should not and 
in some instances may not specify details into which the 
Legislature may go in dealing with that subJect, but held 
that the purposes of the legislation must be definitely speci-
fied either broadly or in detail in the call or the message. 
This case has been cited with approval by that juris-
diction in Hope v. Oliver, 196 Ark. 394, 117 S. W. 2d 1072. 
In the Oliver case the call provided for the removal of 
toll fares on bridges. The Legislature passed an act to re-
place revenues lost by bridge tolls which imposed a fee for 
auto inspection. It was held that that fee was not within 
the call. The court admitted the presumption of validity of 
all acts passed by the Legislature and conceded the argu-
ment that the ·Legislature can, within the scope of the call, 
decide what is best for the state. It was argued in that case 
that to keep bridges free from tolls, revenues should be 
raised to supplant toll revenues. The court said that pre-
sumably the Governor considered the loss of revenues and 
discounted the need for remedial legislation. Otherwise, 
they said, he would have included the suggestion to raise a 
revenue to bridge that deficiency. 
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An Arkansas case (McCarrell v. Clyde C. L. 198 Ark. 
896, 132 S. W. 2d 19) although holdin-g the act there in 
question valid, cited the Weldon case as being established 
law in that state. That latter case did not weaken the hold-
ing of the Weldon case. The call was broad : to create a 
fund for tubercular treatment. No specification reduced its 
all-encompassing character. We agree with this holding. 
In Stocke v. Edwards, 295 Mo. 402, 244 S. W. 802, the 
Governor's call recommended that assessors in cities of 
over 500,000 inhabitants be made elective. An act provid-
ing for that election, establishing a new Board of Tax 
Equalization and defining new duties for both the assessor 
and the new Board was held beyond the scope of the call. 
The Legislature under that call was not permitted to enact 
a measure covering a greater number of details and par-
ticulars relating to the authority and duties of the 
assessors although it was permitted to deal with assessors as 
to the election thereof. That case cited with approval State 
ex rel Rice v. Edwards, ... Mo .... , 241 S. W. 945. There 
the Governor called for re-districting of cities for the elec-
tion of Justices of the Peace. The act as passed dealt with 
both Justices of the Peace and Constables. The manner 
of dealing with Justices of the Peace was within the call, 
but the subject of constables was without and the act was 
voided. 
In State v. Adams, 323 Mo. 729, 19 S. W. 2d 671, a call 
to restore capital punishment and fix the method of execu-
tion was held not to include the power to permit the jury 
to decide whether death should or should not be imposed~ 
The court held the intent was to restore capital punishment 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
and fix the method of sentence and not to deal with who 
should choose the sentence to be imposed. 
In Wells v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 110 
Mo. 286, 19 S. W. 530, a call authorized the Legislature to 
pass laws correcting abuses, unjust discrimination and ex-
tortion on rates of railroads. An act required safety ap-
pliances on railroad switches and abolished the defense of 
contributory negligence in situations arising therefrom. 
The court held that the Legislature was called to correct 
abuses by railroads, but those abuses were spelled out· in 
the form of rates and not general abuses of railroads. 
Similarly, Trenton Graded School Districts v. Board of 
Education, 278 Ky. 607, 129 S. W. 143 holds that the gen-
eral subject matter (in this instance schools) can be limited 
by specifications of what problems may be considered in 
regard to schools, and an act would be held invalid providing 
for annexation to school districts under a call to provide 
approved high school service for all pupils, and to deal with 
teachers' retirement. Columbia & Pulaski Turnpike Comp-
any v. Hughes, 174 S. W. 1108, 131 Tenn. 267 held that a 
call to enact a regulation for turnpikes did not open the 
session to any type of a road. 
All of these cases hold that the specification of a par-
ticular, within a general, subject opens the session only 
for consideration of the particular, not the general, subject. 
The lesser cannot include the greater, and when the auth-
ority is given to deal with a subject only as it relates to 
revenues for a specific purpose, the original subject can-
not be dealt with in a manner designed to change its entire 
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structure. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 94 Colo. 215, 29 
P. 2d 705. In that case a call "to provide aid for the desti-
tute and suffering" did not permit the enactment of an 
elaborate code controlling liquor although a portion of the 
revenue provided for in that code was earmarked for the 
purposes enumerated in the call. We cite this case not for 
its implication that elaborate regulation of smoking could 
not have here been enacted under the Governor's call, but 
cite it for its holding, as applied to this case, that the state's 
tax structure may not be invaded or realigned under the 
guise of providing some revenues for the purposes in the 
call. 
Exhibit J affirmatively shows that the tax problem had 
been deferred by the Public School Survey Commission, 
the Legislative Council and the Governor (Exhibit J, paras. 
2, 3, 4, ·5 and 6). We show tho~e exhibits not to establish 
lack of wisdom in the cigarette tax, but to show that it 
was a legitimately separate, logically distinct subject deem-
ed by all three principals quoted in that Exhibit to be 
separate and apart from the "school problem" to be rem-
edied at this session. 
As said in Commonwealth v. Liveright, 161 Atl. at 
page 403: 
,-,This constitutional provision [limiting the sub-
ject matter at special sessions] contemplates that 
there shall first exist in the executive's mind a def-
inite conception of the public emergency which de-
mands an extraordinary session. His mental atti-
tude or intention is expressed in his proclamation, 
the purpose of which is to inform the members of 
the Legislature of subjects for legislation and to 
advise the public generally that objections may be 
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presented if desired. It is not only a guide or chart 
with respect to which the Legislature may act, but 
also a check restricting its action so that rights may 
not be affected without notice. The proclamation 
may contain many or few subjects according to the 
Governor's conception of the public need. While the 
subjects may be stated broadly or in general terms, 
the special business as related to the general subject 
on which legislation is desired should be designated 
by imposing qualifying matter to. reduce or restric·t" 
(Emphasis added) . 
2. The Gove~nor, if he authorized an increased tax 
at the state level, authorized only a property 
tax. 
Sec. 59-9-4, U. C. A. 1953 provides as follows: 
"The commission shall then determine the min-
imum rate of levy on each dollar of assessed valua-
tion of the tangible property in the state that will 
raise sufficient supplementary revenue to pay the 
state's contribution to the cost of the minimum 
school program for that year and any deficiency 
from previous years, provided that in accordance 
with the provisions of section 7, Article XIII, of the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, not more than 
75% of the state's portion of the revenue necessary 
to finance the operation and maintenance of such 
minimum school program shall be raised by the state 
property tax levy. The commission shall take into 
consideration, from the best information available, 
and shall make allowance for, the estimated tax de-
linquency for the current year, and shall be conser-
vative in its estimate of revenue to assure to the 
extent possible amnle funds for the state's contri-
bution to the cost of the minimum school program. 
The tax commission shall immediately thereafter 
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transmit to the county auditor of each county and 
to the state auditor a statement of such rate, and 
upon its receipt the county auditor must, in writing, 
notify the state tax commission of the receipt there-
of." 
Under that section the state's property tax levy is 
geared to· meet the st.ate's required contribution to the 
minimum school program under any such definition of that 
program as the Legislature may prescribe, after other 
revenues to the fund have been exhausted. Sec. 59-9-31 
was amended by H. B. 28 of the Special Session to require 
school districts to exert greater effort locally which amount-
ed to an automatic deduction of the state's obligation under 
59-9-4. Even without the stern mandate to local districts 
for increased effort 59-9-4 would still have operated to pro-
vide the state's contribution to the new minimum school 
program and thus even if the new program proved to be 
more costly to the state2 the Governor's call would have 
specified only property taxation at both the state and local 
levels since, of course, property taxation is the only means 
of revenue for .school districts3 • 
Some states, we will concede, have a rule that the speci-
fication of a particular subject opens the entire subject for 
legislation. Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 591, 3 S. W. 
109. Martin v. Riley, 20 Cal. 2d 28, 123 P. 2d 491 seems to 
follow that view but an examination of that case shows 
that the court quite possibly had no occasion to decide that 
1The statute requiring a certain amount of local effort by school dis-
tricts participating in a supplementary state-guaranteed program. 
2 Which we doubt from our interpretation of Exhibit K. 
3 Secs. 59-9-2, 59-9-3, 53-7-8, 53-7-9, 53-7-10, 53-7-12, 53-7-13, U. C. A. 
1953. 
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question. The dissent (page 497 of 123 P. 2d) forcibly 
argues that the specification within the general subject 
was broad enough to cover the legislation enacted and that 
the rule of the majority therefore was unnecessarily broad. 
' Likewise Blackford v. Judith Basin County, 109 Mont. 578, 
98 P. 2d 872, 162 A. L. R. 639 could have been similarly 
decided. If those cases do stand, however, for the rule 
that the designation of any part of a subject opens the 
entire subject for legislative action, we believe them to be 
in the decided minority. The California case bases its hold-
ing on the Texas case (Baldwin v. State, 3 S. W. 109, 21 
Tex. App. 591) which has been sharply criticized in recent 
decisions such as Commonwealth v. Liveright, 161 Atl. 697 
at 704, 308 Pa. 35, and is diametrically opposed by Smith 
et al v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N. W. 453. 
Extended, the Texas rule permits absolutely no execu-
tive control over the special session since one might be de-
fied to find any subject for legislation that is not in some 
manner related to the subject in the call, no matter how 
particularly the latter is specified. Thus every call might 
imply a tax either for the administration, support or main-
tenance of the subject to be considered. Merely the call for 
any Special Session of the Legislature would then be notice 
to every citizen and every person conducting affairs in 
the state that his rights might be affected. The Constitu-
tion has limited the Legislature in this regard to one such 
general session each biennium. 
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POINT II. 
THE GOVERNOR PROPOSED NO LEGISLA-
TION MANIFESTLY REQUIRING THE AP-
PROPRIATION OF ADDITIONAL REVENUE 
AND DID NOT BY THAT TYPE OF IMPLICA-
TION AUTHORIZE A TAX ON CIGARETTES 
(H. B. 34). 
1. The Governor's authorized legislation required 
no additional state taxes. 
Plaintiff will argue that the total cost of the minimum 
school program was increased by the First Special Session 
of the 30th Legislature. This we will concede (Exhibit K). 
However, the minor premise upon which plaintiff builds his 
hypothesis that the increased program requires new and 
additional revenue imposed and collected at the state level 
we believe to be false. Plaintiff says public schools now 
cost more money. The state contributes to the public school 
system, therefore the st~te must collect more taxes. Ex-
cept for the enactment of a novel program of shifting the 
burden between state and local effort, this would be valid. 
The theme of H. B.'s 27 and 28 and S. B. 22 was to 
require greater local effort _for better equalization (Ex-
hibit J, para. 5). A comparison of the figures opposite 
Item 5, Exhibit K indicates as much. It is common knowl-
edge, likewise susceptible of judicial notice, that ·the State 
of Utah has become in arrears some $8,000,000.00 in its 
debt to the Teachers' Retirement Fund. The new law 
(S. B. 22) provides for liquidation of that debt and inte-
grated state-social security retirement benefits at less state 
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obligation without doing violence to vested rights of mem-
bers of the system. In adding items 3 and 4 of Exhibit 
K the state contribution is higher under the new law than 
under the old school progr~m. However, the footnotes show 
that even if the state were up to date on its payments into 
the Teachers' Retirement Fund under prior law their obli-
gation for this year only would nevertheless carry the 
state's legal obligation over its expected obligation under the 
new law both for Teachers' Retirement and for operation 
~nd maintenance of the minimum school program other-
wise. 
Approximately two and one-half years of study of 
the "school problem" had at the time of the session yielded 
no answer to the tax structure and the equitable apportion-
ment of the burden between property and non-property rev-
enues. The subject, therefore, had been deferred ·pending 
th outcome of a study conducted by the Legislative Council 
and the Tax Commission (Exhibit J. paras. 3 and 5). The 
Special Session was for the purpose of re-determining the 
classroom unit and realigning the respective property tax 
burden to be imposed as between the state and the local 
taxing authority. The question was: From where should 
the increased cost come? It was assumed by the School 
Survey Commission, the Legislative Council and the Gov-
ernor that it must come from property taxation. The sec-
ond question then was: At what level? It clearly appears 
from the schedule in Exhibit K that the lot fell to the local 
districts. 
After two and one-half years of study by research 
agencies of the Legislature contrived to study and investi-
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gate the "school problem" and after that study yielded 
only the assurance that the tax structure would be studied 
and recommended for action at the 1955 General Session, 
a spontaneous proposition to create a new and additional 
tax without notice, consideration or calculation appears all 
the more abortive and repugnant to the constitutional con-
siderations of notice and opportunity to be represented and 
to the "Governor's conception of the public emergency 
which demands an extraordinary session." Commonwealth 
v. Liveright, supra. The Legislature chose to substitute its 
own judgment for that of the Governor as to what the extra-
ordinary circumstance constituted in violation of Art. VII, 
Sec. 6. 
It may not be said that the Governor was attempting to 
"dictate" to the Legislature when his recommendations 
were precisely those of the two research agencies4 of the 
Legislature. To say that the Governor has violated the 
separation of powers by dictating to the Legislature that 
the increased cost of the school program shall be borne by 
property taxation whether state or local is to say that the 
parents who bear children to attend schools dictate to the 
Legislature for the same reason; for if the definition of 
the minimum school program had remained the same the 
state's contribution to that program would have increased 
year by year by virtue of the provisions of 59-9-4, which 
requires a state contribution to guarantee the minimum 
school program based upon a given number of dollars for 
each thirty students who attend school. If the law had re-
4 Public School Survey Commission (Ch. 14, Laws of 1951, 1st. S. S.); 
Legislative Council (Ch. 4, Title 36, U. C. A. 1953). 
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mained unchanged the state's commitment would have risen 
at a ratio of almost 3 to 1 over local contributions as school 
population increased. All this without any action by the 
Legislature. 
2. If the Governor's message and recommended 
legislation implied authorization to tax ciga-
rettes, his express words rejected that impli-
cation. 
If it be said that from portions of the Governor's 
proclamation and messages it may be implied that he ex-
pected the Legislature to respond thereto by opening up new 
and additional sources of revenue, then the express language 
of the Governor repudiates and completely traverses any 
such implication~ The Governor said in his message of De-
cember 4, 1953 : 
"I am not here to propose new or higher taxes 
to finance the school program." 
If the Governor had said "Here is the school problem 
-solve it," he would have violated every purpose and 
. spirit of Art. VII, Sec. 6. See Denver & ·Rio Grande Rail-
road Company v. Moss, 50 Colo. 282, 115 P. 696; Nielson v. 
Chicago C. B. & 0. R. R. Company (C. C. A.) 187 Fed. 393. 
No act passed could have been responsive to that call. The 
Governor could in our opinion have specified certain sub-
jects within which the Legislature might act and only 
legislation responsive to that charted program and to that 
notice to the public could have been constitutionally enacted. 
Commonwealth v. Liveright; Smith v. Curran, supra. By 
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implication he would have denied the power to act in other 
subjects. But by expressly prohibiting in no uncertain terms 
their promiscuous activity in the field of taxation he did 
more toward outlining the program and defining proper 
fi~lds of legislation than was required of him. That express 
rejection of new or increased taxes dispels any implied 
acceptance of them. The Governor's veto message (Ex-
hibit J, para. 6) shows his intent as it related back to his 
original message. While the bill would not have been valid 
even had he signed it5 the Governor's omission to argue the 
merits of the bill in his veto message shows clearly what his 
"mental attitude, intention or conception of the public 
need"6 was, since he rejected it upon the ground that he 
had not previously admitted it. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion and summary we urge this Court to adopt 
the majority view that the enumeration of items within 
one general subject in th~· Governor's proclamation for· a 
Special Session does not open that session for considera-
tion of any unnam~d part of the general subject. Alterna-
tively "\Ve submit that even if that rule is not adopted that 
the court take judicial notice of the apparent conclusion 
that nothing transpiring at the First Special Session of the 
30th Legislature required a resort to state taxation at all, 
since the burden of the increased cost of the minimum 
school program was thrown upon local districts and the 
5State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P. 2d 929. 
6 Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697, 703. 
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burden of teachers' retirement was appreciably shifted to 
Federal Social Security coverage. We respectfully urge ~hat 
under no theory can it be said that the Governor proposed 
a program demanding new or increased taxation in any 
field other than local property or state-local property taxa-
tion and created no condition requiring resort to new 
sources. 
We respectfully contend that under no theory of this 
case can H. B. 34 be said to have been within the scope of 
the Governor's proclamation or subsequent messages to the 
Legislature and it is therefore unconstitutional under the 
mandatory limitation in Art.- VII, Sec. 6, Constitution of 
Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
H. R. WALDO, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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